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**Models and Political Attitudes of Fundamentalist Groups
in Indonesian Presidential Elections**

Jafar Ahmad¹; Hengki Firmanda²; Mahmud Hibatul Wafi³

^{1,3}Faculty of Ushuluddin, Institut Agama Islam Negeri Kerinci, Indonesia

²Faculty of Law, University of Riau, Indonesia

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MODELS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS IN INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Jafar Ahmad¹; Hengki Firmanda²; Mahmud Hibatul Wafi³

^{1,3}Faculty of Ushuluddin, Institut Agama Islam Negeri Kerinci, Indonesia

²Faculty of Law, University of Riau, Indonesia

¹Contributor Email: jafar@iainkerinci.ac.id

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Abstract

Islamic fundamentalist groups played an important role in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election. They openly sided with the number 2 candidate, Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Solahudin Uno. Even today, the presidential election was marked by polarization and religious sentiments that are very strong and sharp. This study examined the model of presidential election contestation that will likely take place in 2024, the position of fundamentalist groups in political contestation, and its relation to religious polarization trends. This qualitative research used a case study approach to explore political models and attitudes in presidential election contestation. Interest group theory was placed to analyze the issue. The results showed that the map of contestation that will occur in 2024 will still be the same as the 2019 presidential election contestation. Second, the division between religious groups will still occur in the 2024 presidential election. Third, the alignment of religious fundamentalist groups in the 2024 presidential election will lead to figures willing and able to accommodate their groups.

Keywords: Fundamentalism; Polarization; Presidential Election; Religious Groups.



A. Introduction

The two presidential election periods in Indonesia, which crowned Joko Widodo as President of the Republic of Indonesia (2014-2019 and 2019-2024), have created an alarming wave of polarization. The masses at the grassroots level are divided into two central poles: government supporters and anti-government supporters (Hayat & Nurhakki, 2022). The polarization that occurs is not solely due to ideological differences. However, ideology is used by certain groups as an instrument to legitimize differences. The goal is that the masses consolidated to one pole will be easier to move or mobilize for electoral interests in the presidential election (Khamdan, 2022). Thus, the two presidential elections in Indonesia have made the colors of each group more visible.

The division that had already occurred did not immediately end and even became sharper when the Jokowi administration, at the beginning of its second term (2019-2024), began to take a firm stance against religious fundamentalist groups. The existence of two Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which are considered part of religious fundamentalist groups, has ended (Chaqoqo & Ma'mun, 2022).

The Indonesian people will again elect a President in 2024. The polarization formed since the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections will most likely be repeated in the 2024 presidential election. Religious fundamentalist groups, some of which have been disbanded by the government (HTI and FPI), will choose the opposite stance to Jokowi and his supporting groups (Budiman et al., 2022). They are increasingly consolidated to fight Jokowi's government after being disbanded. The question is, what will be the model of contestation in the 2024 presidential election?

This research will answer that critical question. Many researchers have specifically portrayed identity politics in the presidential election, such as Panggi Syarwi's (2022) research on "Issue Polarization, Identity Politics, and Public Division in the 2019 Presidential Election". This research examines the division of issues and identity politics that resulted in the 2019

presidential election dividing the community. Then, "Islam and Identity Politics: Conflict in the 212 Movement in the Perspective of Indonesian History" by Yusril Fahmi Adam (2022).

This research analyzes the identity politics of the 212 movements through a national historical approach. Based on a literature review conducted by Sihidi et al. (2020), the study of identity politics has four dominant keywords that often appear: political identity, identity, politics, and political ideology. It shows that these topics have been the main focus of previous studies. In addition, identity politics is closely related to using identity as a basis for political action. It is a significant challenge for democratic order in the future.

The above studies show that no research analyzes the possibility of a presidential election contestation model for the Republic of Indonesia in 2024 and explicitly relates it to Islamic fundamentalist groups based on the contestation map that occurred in 2019. It is what is novel in this research. This research is analyzed using interest group theory (interest group politics) to see the relationship between the government and fundamentalist groups. As Cigler & Loomis (2011) argue, the greater the government's involvement, the more special interests develop to influence policy. This research is also expected to dissect the meeting and dividing points between these interest groups to see opportunities to reduce polarization to create a relatively conducive presidential election atmosphere for Indonesia.

B. Method

The research method used is qualitative and descriptive research with a case study approach (Yin, 2016) because the research intends to systematically describe and explain symptoms, facts or events, problems, phenomena, services, or procedures and provide information about situations, people's lives or information that describes people's attitudes (Nurwiyati, 2017).

The primary theoretical approach used is the interest group. In Ramlan Surbakti's view, interest groups are groups with the same characteristics, attitudes, beliefs, or goals who agree to organize to secure



each other in achieving common goals. These interest groups usually have a leadership model and resources in the form of money for operationalizing activities. All members of the group have interests that must be realized in order to survive in the future. Efforts to achieve these interests require the support of various people. The form of this strength is the support from a group consisting of several individuals. This form is called an interest group. Interest groups can also be defined as instruments to strengthen the interests of their members in a political system. Another definition of interest groups is the organization's efforts to influence government decisions; however, these groups tend not to be in power (Sahati et al., 2022).

C. Result and Discussion

1. Fundamentalism Groups as an Interest Group

The interest groups discussed in this article refer to Islamic fundamentalist groups, namely, those with the same thinking style, puritanism of Islam (puritanism). This group's way of thinking is intolerant of various religious expressions. They carry the jargon back to the Koran and Hadith, condemn and fight heresy, tend to be literal, and believe in the perfection of Islam in various implementations in political, economic, and socio-cultural life. This group also emphasizes the mainstreaming of religion (religious deprivatization) in the struggle for political power (Haynes, 2015).

In theory, this interest group was born because everyone has an interest that must be fought to achieve or maintain their life in society or a country. One determining factor that encourages the creation of interest groups is the dominance of a person in the community or the domination of one state over another. So, domination is seen as endangering the survival of other individuals or countries. From here arises the desire of individuals to cooperate with other individuals to form an interest group in gaining the domination of other groups or countries (Maiwan, 2016).

Many public issues have become a concern and have been explored by Islamic fundamentalist groups to strengthen their echo as a defender of Islam. Zionism and the occupation of Palestine by Israel are international



issues that can unite the movement of this group. This group also often popularizes the issue of communism and Christianity as a binder for actions and raising opinions, including in their political activities in Indonesia (Syeirazi, 2020).

This group creates an institution to ensure the survival of the group, as well as to influence the public and government. This group tries to dominate so that their goals and interests are more readily accepted and implemented in people's lives. They carry the spirit of the caliphate (in various colors), are passionate about Arabization, and tend to see Islam as a form and identity rather than substance and content (Syeirazi, 2020).

Various kinds of literature divide interest groups into two forms: first, referred to as private interest groups. This group has the characteristic of persistently trying to fight for the interests of group members. Second, public interest groups. This group is more aggressive in pressuring the government so that the policies are created to favor the people's interests. The agenda of this group is not only oriented to the interests of members but claimed as an effort to fight for the broader public interest (Satriawan, 2022).

Heywood divides these interest groups into three models: first, communal groups. This group is formed naturally because its members are consciously involved and actively become part of the group structure. They have the same sentiment based on certainties, which can be due to regional ties, loyalty, kinship, or belief in a religion. Second, institutional groups are identified as part of the government machine. Third, associational groups identify with a collection of people who, in achieving their goals, lead to an instrumental essence (Heywood, 2018).

In the context of this research, purification groups, which carry the purification agenda of Islam, are included in the form of public interest groups. They tend to influence or pressure the government and bring up religious issues so that government policies take their side, especially regarding the purification of Islam, formalization of Islamic law, or the mission of establishing an Islamic state.



2. Anatomy of Religious Fundamentalism Groups

a. Understanding Purification and Takfiri in Indonesia

In Indonesia, the number of these fundamentalist groups continues to grow. Almost half of Muslims in Indonesia, namely urban Muslims, tend to support this fundamentalist group. The data records that 49.5 percent of Indonesian Muslims are affiliated with NU organizations, Muhammadiyah 4.3 percent, other Islamic organizations 1.3 percent, PA 212 0.7 percent, and FPI 0.4 percent. The number of Muslims not affiliated with Islamic organizations is significant, only slightly below NU, which is 43.8 percent. This data is similar to the 2016 SMRC survey, which identified Indonesian Muslims without affiliation with Islamic organizations, reaching 42.9 percent. This includes urban Muslims, namely a group of Muslims with moderate and pragmatic religious orientations. They are a group with a high desire to become more religious but without going through a systematic study of Islam. They only use digital media and the internet to study Islam. This urban Muslim group with a large population is at risk of being exposed to purification and Islamic fundamentalism movements. They support the purification way of thinking (Syeirazi, 2020).

The purification of Islam, promoted by this fundamentalist group, is rooted in the Salafism group. The basis of the doctrine of Salafism refers to the thought of Ibn Taimiyah (1263-1328 AD). Many kinds of literature even mention Ibn Taimiyah as the father of Islamic fundamentalism. Ibn Taimiyah is the one who revives the culture of disbelief (*takfir*) with absolute opinion. Ibn Taimiyah did not hesitate to disbelieve in scholars, attacking the science of kalam and Sufism. Ibn Taimiyah said that the Prophet was not infallible (*ma'shum*), the Prophet's parents were called indels, pilgrimage to the graves of prophets and pious people is considered a sinful journey, and killing indels (*kafir*) is permissible (Ammar & Xu, 2018; Noorhayati & Fata, 2017; Umar, 2014).

The teachings and thoughts of Islamic fundamentalism in the style of Ibn Taimiyah grew in the hands of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (1703-1792), a founder of the Wahhabi movement. The doctrine of Wahhabism then gained legitimacy and a place in the hands of Muhammad bin Saud, who

used Wahhabis to seize and perpetuate the power of the Saud dynasty in Saudi Arabia (Syeirazi, 2020, p. 8).

The modernism movement emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries, carried out by the Jamaluddin Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh groups in Egypt (Sahrullah et al., 2022). The proliferation of secularism and liberalism in the body of Muslims is the impact of the movement promoted by Abduh and Afghani. Rasyid Rida, Abduh's student, later turned the tajdid movement promoted by his teacher into a purification movement for Islam. He revived Wahhabism and the concept of Ibn Taimiyah in Egypt, then showed his sympathy openly to the Wahhabism of Ibn Saud in Arabia. Rashid Rida's attitude paved the way for the birth of the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) in Egypt and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) in Pakistan. IM was founded by Hasan Al-Banna, a student of Rashid Rida, in 1928. Meanwhile, JI was created by Abu al A'la Al-Maududi in India in 1941 (Syeirazi, 2020).

After being involved in bloody actions, the assassination of the Egyptian PM in the Gamal Abdul Nasser, IM era, was repressed. IM activists then exodus from Egypt and obtained protection from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There, the IM group carried out business activities, radicalized the Wahhabi movement, and placed Saudi Arabia as the main base of operations (Aravik, 2017). IM, in subsequent developments, split into many factions. One of its largest factions formed a new organization called Hizb al-Tahrir (HT) in 1953, founded by Taqyuddin al Nabhani (Sahrasad & Chaidar, 2012) – the striking difference between the two lies in the conception of the state. IM tends to recognize the concept of a nation-state and choose a parliamentary movement to realize its Islamization ideals. Meanwhile, HT is trying to create the concept of a caliphate. Although different, their tendency to purification and Islamic orthodoxy (Syeirazi, 2020), they have the same common thread and basis for thinking.

b. Understanding Purification and Takfiri

The wave of Wahhabism entered Indonesia in 1803 AD through three people from West Sumatra, namely Haji Poor, Haji Sumanik, and Haji



Piobang. The second wave of Wahhabism came in 1980 after the Arab empire sponsored the establishment of the LPBA, which later changed to LIPIA. LIPIA later became the center of the spread of Wahhabism in Indonesia. The emergence of LPBA or LIPIA in Indonesia is a vital role of Muhammad Natsir, a Masyumi figure whose party was dissolved by Soekarno and was never rehabilitated by Suharto (Tamba et al., 2022).

Natsir, through the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), succeeded in convincing the King of Saudi Arabia to stem the influence of Shia in Indonesia and eventually established LPBA/LIPIA. Natsir received a scholarship to send his cadres to the Middle East around 1980. Some of those who were sent were Abu Ridho, Mashadi, and Mukhlis Abdi, who gave birth to the initial circle of IM in Natsir's DDII body upon their return to Indonesia. DDII plays a vital role as a channeling agent for the Egyptian IM ideology (Sahati et al., 2022) DDII is the catalyst for four types of Islamic revival at once: LPBA/ LIPIA produces puritan-orthodox Islam, the Campus Mosque Development program produces Puritan-Scientific Islam, Middle East scholarship produces a tarbiyah movement with a puritan-political pattern, and reproduction of militant Islam through the translation of books by IM and JI scholars (Syeirazi, 2020).

Many fundamentalist groups have pioneered the formation of political parties in Indonesia. At first, they were engaged in social, economic, and educational fields. Some have become big and able to influence the government. One of them is the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Before becoming a political party, they worked in campus mosques and established cells called "usrah", with a minimum of 7-10 members. At the campus mosque, this group forms LDK and births KAMMI (Syeirazi, 2020).

PKS is the party that has been the loudest in voicing Palestinian solidarity actions and has been the most consistent in bringing this issue into religious politics. Since this party was founded, Palestinian solidarity actions have been carried out repeatedly and have succeeded in shaping its image and prestige as a party to defend Islam and Palestine. Another

prevalent issue is Christianity; the anti-Christianization campaign was also expressed by forbidding Muslims to say "merry Christmas". Conservative fatwas reject anything considered a covert program of mass Christianization efforts. The issue is processed as a cover for the real struggle, namely the formalization of Islamic law (Syeirazi, 2020).

The appearance of the Islamic activist movement on the national political stage accompanied the birth of the reformation. Amien Rais, a leader of the UGM Jamaah Salahuddin, later founded PAN. AM Saefuddin joined PPP, Jusuf Amir Feisal established the United Nations, and the Tarbiyah group (IM) founded the Justice Party (PKS). PAN and PBB are representations of the aspirations of modernist Islam in politics; PK/ PKS embodies the Islamic aspirations of the moderate wing of IM. PKS can better package its Islamic struggle more tactically and pragmatically. Then HT was transformed into Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). HTI is expanding beyond DDII's orbit. HTI is firmly against the Republic of Indonesia, rejects Pancasila, and condemns democracy (Syeirazi, 2020). Another group that fears Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia is DI/ NII, who transformed into Salafi-jihadi after training in Afghanistan. They are members of the Jamaah Islamiyah. This group is still connected to DDII through Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, former leaders of DDII Solo (Pedrason, 2022).

They are an organized group with the same goals and interests, actively influencing the government to defend or support their way of thinking, the purification of Islam. Outside the government, they become a pressure group. On the other hand, in government, they seek to dominate and influence policies that lead to the purification struggle or the establishment of an Islamic state. The presidential election arena is an essential agenda for this group. They are actively involved in efforts to fight for their agenda in the presidential election.






Figure 1. Anatomy of the relationship between the Indonesian Islamic movement and wahabism (ibnu taimiyah)

3. Polarization Based on Religious Identity in DKI Jakarta Regional Head Election

As an organized group, interest groups always have a collective goal to influence the policies made or run by the government. They try to influence the government in policy-making so that it is in line with the wishes of the groups they represent. To realize its goals, including influencing the government, this interest group has great power in the form of human resources, financial support, and an extensive network. These interest groups often set the agenda, raise issues, disseminate ideas, formulate policies, and pressure the government. Often they carry agendas representing the institution's and members' interests.

Fundamentalism groups in Indonesia, as an interest group, have been involved in the political arena, especially in the national leadership selection process, starting from the 2014 presidential election and continuing until the 2019 presidential election, by supporting specific candidates who are considered capable of defending and fighting for their interests. This group seeks to influence the Islamic community in Indonesia and to support the candidate it supports by burning religious sentiments.



Before moving to the presidential election, this fundamentalist group had played its role in the 2012 DKI Jakarta *Pilkada*¹ and continued in the 2017 DKI Jakarta *Pilkada*. They used the DKI *Pilkada* instrument to fight for something, which they claimed was a struggle to defend Islam. Driven by FPI, led by Habib Rizieq, who supports the Fauzi Bowo-Nachrowi Ramli, they ignite religious issues as an excuse to support "Foke-Nara." Sentiment against unbelieving leaders suddenly appears. FPI has openly campaigned to Muslims that Ahok, Jokowi's partner, is a non-Muslim who does not deserve to be elected. Habib Salim Al-Attas, Chairman of the DPD FPI Jakarta, quoted the DPP FPI fatwa, which strictly prohibits Muslims in Indonesia from making non-Muslim leaders up to the government level (CNN Indonesia, 2018).

FPI and PKS' support for Foke-Nara in the second round has strengthened religious sentiment toward the Jokowi-Ahok. Although not openly, other Islamic groups, which have a purification line of thought, also sided with Foke-Nara, not Jokowi-Ahok. The emergence of FPI on the *Pilkada* stage, by fueling anti-non-Muslim leaders' sentiments, made the political temperature in the capital hot. The reduction continued after Jokowi-Ahok won the Regional Head Election. When Jokowi became a candidate for President of the Republic of Indonesia in 2014, Ahok ascended the throne to become the Governor of DKI, replacing Jokowi. These religious sentiments were named and continued to be produced. That is the end of the sentiment in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election.

4. Religious Fundamentalism Group in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election

This fundamentalist group also actively influenced the presidential election process in 2014 and 2019. They support specific candidates who are considered figures who can serve their interests. In the 2014 presidential election, this fundamentalist group supported the Prabowo-Hatta. Political

¹ *Pilkada* in Bahasa stands for *Pemilihan Kepala Daerah* (Regional Head Election), hereinafter referred to as *Pilkada* in this paper.



parties affiliated with or have purification lines and thought patterns, such as PKS, PAN, and PBB, also support Prabowo-Hatta. Relevant to other fundamentalist Islamic groups, such as FPI and HTI, which also support Prabowo-Hatta. Religious reasons are the primary basis for this group to support Prabowo-Hatta. FPI, for example, claims to support the Prabowo-Hatta camp because this pair is supported by most of the coalition of Islamic parties. The second reason is that they consistently reject Ahok. Non-Muslims ascended the throne to become governor of DKI Jakarta due to Jokowi's abandonment. This attitude was conveyed openly by FPI High Priest Habib Rizieq Shihab on June 4, 2014, which took place at the FPI post, Petamburan III Jakarta (Nubowo, 2021).

Conflict broke out when FPI linked Jokowi's role in paving the way for non-Muslims to become governor of DKI. FPI considers that Jokowi, elected President of the Republic of Indonesia in 2014, has secretly supported Ahok's move to maintain his power by advancing in the 2017 DKI gubernatorial election. History proves that FPI has become the main driving force in mobilizing Muslim masses, known as the 212 actions, which number millions of people. The way this interest group works is to establish a persuasive relationship. However, when these methods do not work, they will use violent means and coercion, for example, through demonstrations. It is what fundamentalist groups do through demonstrations.

This group tried to garner support from the Islamic masses by attacking Jokowi-Ahok, for personal matters (Muklai et al., 2022). They use the arena of demonstrations as an instrument to spread their political influence. FPI, as the main driving force, then linked Jokowi with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) line, the party that was once the golden child of President Soekarno's era. Rizieq Shihab even wrote a book entitled: "What PKI and How?" FPI distributed a book containing a narrative of the relationship between Jokowi and the PKI (Widyawati et al., 2021). The narrative of Jokowi and the PKI continues to be campaigned by fundamentalist groups.

Kompas Daily conducted an opinion poll, and the result was that 64.0 percent of respondents considered the black campaign to have sparked open



conflict among supporters of the presidential candidate. The *Obor Rakyat* tabloid, a fake newspaper that only appeared in the 2014 presidential election, became a propaganda tool to spread false news against Jokowi (Tempo, 2018). Half of the respondents (58.3%) are worried that the black campaign will damage national unity. This concern arose because the themes that emerged in the black campaign were sentiments of religious groups and fanaticism towards presidential candidates. Such sentiments can lead to hatred towards certain groups (Samosir & Novitasari, 2022).

Prabowo has seen clear evidence that the Islamic masses of 212 succeeded in placing Anies Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno against Ahok in the 2017 DKI *Pilkada*. The identity politics driven by the movement called 212 has proven to be successful in making long history in Jakarta and the national political arena. The identity politics played by this fundamentalist group has worked well, and the implications for Ahok's defeat in DKI Jakarta can be seen. Religious sentiment grew, which caused Ahok to lose. Fundamentalist Muslim groups have aroused religious sentiments, thus creating a perception that supporting Ahok means that Muslims will be considered to support blasphemers to become governors. The attitude of Muslims who support Ahok will be judged as a betrayal of religion (Syaefudin, 2014). Since then, pro-Ahok and anti-Ahok groups have been solidly divided and spread to the 2019 presidential election.

Maswadi Rauf (2001) believes that certain elites or groups often use identity politics to gain broad political support. Primordial bonds can create primordial sentiments and loyalty, forming strong solidarity among group members. This happened in the DKI Jakarta *Pilkada*, where religious sentiments have formed the solidarity of some Islamic groups (Irawan, 2013).

In the 2019 presidential election, Prabowo, who from the start had hooked PKS as a coalition partner, was seen to be supported by the 212 Islamic masses, who once defeated Ahok and supporters of Anies Baswedan in the DKI Jakarta *Pilkada*. The Islamic groups who are members of 212 have declared and campaigned for Muslims in Indonesia to choose Prabowo in the presidential election, not Jokowi. The sentiments of religion



and identity politics that burned in the DKI Jakarta *Pilkada* were replayed in the 2019 Presidential Election (Muharam et al., 2021).

The Muslim masses and their circle again capitalized on Jokowi's issue related to the PKI. Rizieq then campaigned for new terms, the Mecca and Beijing axes, for all Muslims in Indonesia. The terms Mecca and Beijing have discriminatory connotations and can stir up sentiment. The Mecca Axis refers to a group of religious Muslims ready to defend their religion in the 2019 presidential election by supporting Prabowo Subianto. In comparison, the term Beijing axis refers to those who support Jokowi. The anti-China sentiment was once sparked in the DKI Regional Head Election, which referred to Ahok, who was eventually imprisoned on charges of blaspheming Islam (Samosir & Novitasari, 2022).

The political maneuver the Islamic fundamentalist group carried out through the 212 movements gave birth to the *ijtima' ulama*. This group uses this *ijtima'* to recommend that all Muslims in Indonesia vote for Prabowo in the presidential election (Annas et al., 2019). Amien Rais then helped fuel religious sentiment by creating a dichotomy of supporters of the Allah Party and the Satan Party. Allah's party refers to the group of Muslims who support Prabowo, while the Satan party refers to those who support Jokowi (cnnindonesia.com, 2018).

This movement has successfully brought Prabowo to a landslide victory in the pockets or mass bases of fundamentalist Muslims, especially in the Darul Islam area, which once tried to make Indonesia a country that enforces Islamic sharia. Prabowo's vote was dominant in Sumatra, mainly in the Masjumi base in West Sumatra (85.03 percent), then in Aceh (DI/TII base) (83.11 percent). Prabowo's victory was also clearly seen in Banten (62.56 percent), West Java (59.98 percent), and South Sulawesi (58.48 percent) (Sihidi et al., 2020).

5. Contestation Model in the 2024 Presidential Election

Islamic groups that carry the spirit of purification have been actively involved in the 2019 presidential election, sparking religious sentiments. As explained above, they support Prabowo and are anti-Jokowi. Even though

Jokowi has confirmed that he will not run again in the 2024 presidential election for constitutional reasons, it does not mean that fundamentalist groups will leave the political arena of the presidential election. They will still be involved in the presidential election arena to support specific candidates who can support their aspirations or goals.

The arena of the DKI Regional Head Elections and the Presidential Election has further strengthened the solidity of this group. Similar values cause a group to have the same way of life, thinking, and habits. This condition can give birth to group solidarity based on religion. These similarities will lead them to defend their group, even with sacrifices in the form of lives. Identity politics is the actualization of the values absorbed by the communities in society that form political power (Suyanto et al., 2022).

The emergence of identity politics in the presidential election is caused by religious symbols that are believed to increase the popularity of candidates. Religious symbols are played because they are considered to touch the emotional side of the Indonesian Muslim community, which makes up the majority. Islamic fundamentalist groups then use this momentum to embody Islamic ideology in a country. The amount of support for this fundamentalist group is relevant to a survey conducted by SMRC in 2017, which stated that as many as 20 million Indonesians want the establishment of a *Khilafah Islamiyah* in Indonesia (Herianto & Wijanarko, 2022). This number is equivalent to the respondents agreeing to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia (20.7 percent). That number will continue to increase until the 2024 presidential election (Syeirazi, 2020).

Referring to the contestation model in the 2019 Presidential Election, where polarization manifests itself in two big poles, 'cebong versus kampret,' the groups that fight in the upcoming 2024 presidential election will still come from the same group. The opposing groups in the presidential election are from the same two poles. Only the actors who will be supported and promoted are different. Islamic fundamentalist groups do not use ideology to determine the direction of support. Because if they highlight ideology, they should have supported Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin in the



2019 presidential election. Ma'ruf Amin is the only figure with a kyai background and is very Islamic. However, the Islamic fundamentalism group choose to support Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno because of Jokowi's factors, who is already considered a figure who is hostile to Islam.

Moreover, Jokowi is a PDIP cadre supported by PDIP, a political party labeled by the Islamic fundamentalism group, as a party with lines and places where generations of the PKI group's descendants will gather (Rusdi, 2022). Some of these Islamic fundamentalism groups are family, grandchildren or great-grandchildren of the Masjumi party and the DDII organization formed by Natsir, where Natsir and Masjumi were victims of PKI slander during the Sukarno leadership, the biological father of Megawati Soekarnoputri, the General Chair of the PDIP. This condition is exacerbated by massively narrated campaigns created by the FPI group, which labels Jokowi personally as having links to the PKI line (Barata & Simanjuntak, 2019).

The fact is that Jokowi is a Muslim figure who is obedient to worship and has never been hostile to Islam (Maulianza, 2019). Jokowi's firm attitude towards HTI and FPI is not due to religious factors but because the two organizations have indeed ignited sentiments and endangered the unity and integrity of the Republic of Indonesia (Harahap, 2022). However, Jokowi's attitude is generalized for Islamic fundamentalist groups as hostility towards Islam. Islam in Indonesia is not only represented in the form of FPI or HTI. This is because they can appear as entities for the wider community. After all, they are few. Their presence can be considered a representative of their group, whether it is ethnicity, community, association, or even religion. There was a certain elite's intention to maintain the division. The goal is to make getting people's votes in the presidential election easier. This group does not care about the implications for the division of the nation and state (Samosir & Novitasari, 2022).

The next question is, where does this group of Islamic fundamentalists take sides in the 2024 presidential election? From the primordial perspective, groups belonging to specific communities will be more easily consolidated by their members. The formation of a desire to

communicate between them can be seen as an effort to build consolidation. Based on this perspective, it is essential to see that the primordial relationship between group members will influence their attitudes and actions, including determining political choices (Akmaluddin, 2018).

The experience of the Indonesian Islamic fundamentalism group in leading Anies Baswedan to become the Governor of DKI Jakarta in the 2017 *Pilkada* will be a virtual memory for their political choices in the upcoming 2024 presidential election. If Anies Baswedan emerges as a presidential candidate, this Islamic fundamentalist group will most likely support him. This support is because, *first*, this Islamic fundamentalism group has a track record and closeness to the figure of Anies Baswedan when he won in the DKI Jakarta *Pilkada*. *Second*, even though Anies Baswedan has a different Islamic background from the fundamentalist group, they perceive Anis as a figure who will not threaten their existence if they succeed in becoming the President of the Republic of Indonesia. Fundamentalists see Anis as a person of Arab descent with Muslim identity and the same color as them. On the other hand, groups that have supported Ahok or Jokowi in two presidential elections (2014-2019 and 2019-2024) will be at odds with Islamic fundamentalism.

At this point, the strengthening of identity politics goes hand in hand with the tendency of fundamentalism in attitudes and behavior caused by many factors. So far, some experts consider the emergence of reinforcing primordial values because of the pressure of globalization, which is considered a threat to diversity. Globalization is seen as an effort to homogenize diverse perspectives, attitudes, and behaviors. However, globalization is not always synonymous with radicalism or identity politics. This shows that many factors strengthen identity politics in Indonesia, such as history, power, security, control, and other forms of action that strengthen group exclusivity (Ahmad, 2021). In the context of this research, the Islamic fundamentalism group has strengthened its identity after being actively involved in the DKI Jakarta *Pilkada* and the Presidential Election, both in 2014 and 2019. This condition will be repeated in the upcoming 2024



Presidential Election. They will feel threatened if Jokowi supporters return to power. This is why Islamic fundamentalist groups maintain their identity politics in the 2024 presidential election.

D. Conclusion

The presidential election in 2024 will take place in an atmosphere similar to the presidential election in 2019, where Islamic fundamentalist groups as an interest group will still be actively involved in supporting specific candidates. Their involvement in the presidential election stage ensures that the candidate they carry wins so that their goals or interests are achieved. They share the same spirit, namely, carrying the agenda of the purification of Islam and the formalization of Islamic law. This group will not support candidates who oppose or are against the purification agenda of Islam.

How they operate in the 2024 presidential election will also be similar to what was carried out in the 2019 presidential election. This Islamic fundamentalist group uses identity politics to mobilize voters. Religious sentiments are burned to make the presidential election contestation run unhealthy, even leading to hate politics. Identity politics, continuously used in politics, eventually, turn into hate politics. It not only creates conditions for mutual degrading between groups but hates politics, to a certain degree, can create mutual negation. In the world, many civil wars occur because of hate politics.

Conflict and polarization keep repeating themselves occasionally; the author believes that historical milestones are always related to previous milestones. Even though the regime changed, the circle of interest (interest group) never changed. Events from time to time, the perpetrators come from the same group. On that basis, it should be clear for the government, religious leaders, community leaders, and the wider community to identify the movements of these groups to be anticipated as early as possible so that they do not become enlarged and difficult to contain.



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